User-Verifiable Telematics

It is not enough for citizens to be told they have certain rights as users of a given telematic service, under a license (such as FLOSS), legislation (such a national and global privacy protection regulations) or a contract with the service provider (such as Terms of Use). To actually control a telematic service, or a web service, a user needs reasonable practical means to verify the software and the hardware of all servers which run at and beyond the point of decryption of his/her communications with such a service (or "end servers").

We're living in an era in which our personal communications, civic participation and even our votes pass through a digital communication system. Ordinary citizens are continuously exposed to these serious violations of constitutional rights perpetrated by many powerful economic entities, governments or even individual crackpots. At the same time, paradoxically, the worst criminals, corrupt politicians and terrorists are equipped with almost infallible means to conceal their communications.

This is portrayed as an inevitable situation, however we do not believe it to be inevitable, and our goal is to be able to demonstrate and explain which methods of user-verifiable telematics can be put in place by any organization to safeguard their privacy.